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Abstract: The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is a world-wide accepted last-
resort means of reducing the probability and frequency of mid-air collisions between aircraft. 
Unfortunately, it is widely known that in congested airspace, the use of the TCAS may actually lead to 
induced collisions. Therefore, further research regarding TCAS logic is required. In this paper, an 
encounter model is formalised to identify all of the potential collision scenarios that can be induced by 
a resolution advisory that was generated previously by the TCAS without considering the downstream 
consequences in the surrounding traffic. The existing encounter models focus on checking and 
validating the potential collisions between trajectories of a specific scenario. In contrast, the 
innovative approach described in this paper concentrates on quantitative analysis of the different 
induced collision scenarios that could be reached for a given initial trajectory and a rough specification 
of the surrounding traffic. This approach provides valuable information at the operational level. 
Furthermore, the proposed encounter model can be used as a test-bed to evaluate future TCAS logic 
changes to mitigate potential induced collisions in hot spot volumes. In addition, the encounter model 
is described by means of the coloured Petri net (CPN) formalism. The resulting state space provides a 
deep understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship that each TCAS action proposed to avoid an 
actual collision with a potential new collision in the surrounding traffic. Quantitative simulation results 
are conducted to validate the proposed encounter model, and the resulting collision scenarios are 
summarised as valuable information for future air traffic management (ATM) systems. 
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1 Introduction 
A series of mid-air collisions have occurred over a period of 30 years (1956-1986) (DoT, 2011; 
NTSB database, 2015). These collisions spurred the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to launch 
the development of an effective collision avoidance system that would act as a last-resort when there is 
a failure in air traffic controller (ATC)-provided separation services (DoT, 2011). The resulting Traffic 
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) was developed using comprehensive analysis and 
abundant flight evaluations. The traffic display (which depicts the detailed states of nearby traffic) 
assists pilots in the visual acquisition of surrounding traffic, providing them time to prepare to 
manoeuvre the aircraft in the event TCAS advisories are issued. It is particularly important that pilots 
maintain situational awareness and continue to use good judgment in following TCAS advisories. 
Maintain frequent outside visual scan, “see and avoid” vigilance, and continue to communicate as 
needed and as appropriate with ATC (DoT, 2011). This system constitutes a last-resort means, which 
is accepted worldwide, for effective and significant reduction of the collision probability between 
aircraft (Netjasov et al., 2013). 
TCAS equipped in an aircraft does not control the vehicle directly; the TCAS only issue 
advisories to pilots on how to manoeuvre vertically to prevent collision. Evidently, the human 
behaviour (pilot response) has a decisive impact on the collision avoidance (CA) results. However, 
recorded radar data indicate that pilots do not always behave as assumed by the TCAS logic. The 
collision of two aircraft in 2002 over Überlingen demonstrated that not anticipating the spectrum of 
responses limits TCAS’s robustness (Johnson, 2004). 
When TCAS is operative on both aircraft that are involved in a one-on-one encounter, each 
vehicle transmits interrogations to the other via the Mode S link to ensure collision avoidance (CA) 
coordination in the process of encounter resolution. TCAS executes independently of ground-based 
systems, and it relies fully on relevant surveillance equipment on-board the aircraft. TCAS I and its 
improved version, TCAS II, have been defined and approved by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO). These versions differ primarily in their alerting capability (DoT, 2011). TCAS I 
provides traffic advisories (TAs) to assist the pilot in the visual acquisition of intruder aircraft, while 
TCAS II provides both TAs and resolution advisories (RAs). A TA warns pilots of the potential 
encounter with neighbouring traffic. A RA is issued to prevent a collision by commanding the pilots to 
execute an avoidance manoeuvre in the vertical direction. TCAS II version 7.1 is the system that is 
currently in use. The basic operations are the following (DoT, 2011): 
• TCAS broadcasts inquiries and receives answers from neighbouring aircraft to monitor 
the surrounding airspace constantly. 
• TCAS generates a TA when an intruder comes within range of the aircraft and a collision 
is predicted to occur within 20-48 s (depending on the altitude). TCAS aims to draw the 
flight crew’s attention to the potentially hazardous situation, and it provides a traffic 
display as well as an audio alert to help the crew to prepare for any resolution manoeuvre 
that may be required. 
• If the situation deteriorates, and a collision is predicted to occur within 15-35 s 
(depending on the altitude), and TCAS subsequently issues an RA, which is always in the 
vertical plane. With communication between the TCAS to ensure complementary 
manoeuvres, the RA could be passive (do not climb, do not descend) or active (climb, 
descend), depending on the situation. If a RA is issued, then the pilot should respond in a 
timely and calmly manner (normally the reaction time is set to be 5 s) to achieve a safe 
separation. 
• When the threat has passed, TCAS provides a “Clear of Conflict” (CoC) advisory. 
The use of the TCAS has had a positive influence on the safety of flights, being effective, 
beneficial, and significant in reducing the collision probability (Billingsley et al., 2012). According to 
(DoT, 2011), “TCAS II was designed to operate in traffic densities of up to 0.3 aircraft per square 
nautical mile (NM), i.e., 24 aircraft within a 5 NM radius, which was the highest traffic density 
envisioned over the next 20 years”. However, there is growing interest in civil applications of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) (Wildmann et al., 2014). There is also increasing demand 
for air travel (Isaacson, 2014). With applications such as surveillance, in which various aircraft would 
cooperate and compete for a certain target (Yousefi et al., 2013), it is expected that the traffic airspace 
density will increase considerably in certain small areas during short time periods. These highly 
congested regions could be regarded as hot spots (Nosedal et al., 2014). 
The increased airspace usage can induce a secondary threat as a result of a RA issued by a TCAS, 
which may issue an inappropriate suggested resolution that resolves a one-on-one encounter with a 
first threat. Therefore, research that explores such potential collision scenarios is needed to enable Air 
Traffic Management (ATM) to avoid such accidents. 
From 1 January 2005, all civil fixed-wing, turbine-powered aircraft having a maximum take-off 
mass exceeding 5,700 kg (ICAO, 2014), or a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of 
more than 19, are required to be equipped with TCAS II (DoT, 2011), i.e., most but not all aircraft are 
forced to be equipped with TCAS. Therefore, there would be four equipage/response situations: none-
none (no TCAS on either aircraft), TCAS-none (TCAS on only one aircraft), TCAS-TCAS (TCAS on 
both aircraft and both follow the advisory), and TCAS-no response (TCAS on both aircraft but only 
one follows the advisory). Our research purpose is to explore the potential induced collision scenarios 
resulting from TCAS logic for one-on-one encounters in which the involved aircraft are all TCAS 
equipped and the pilots climb/descend to resolve threats by perfectly following the TCAS advisories. 
We utilise the standard model of pilot response to the TCAS advisories. This model involves a 5-
second pilot response delay followed by a 0.25g manoeuvre in compliance with the advisory. Multi-
threat encounters will not be formalised in the model. The focus of the causal model is on the proper 
analysis of secondary threats induced by TCAS logic rather than the analysis of TCAS logic in the 
presence of a secondary threat (Billingsley et al., 2009). 
The subject of this research is the design of an encounter model to identify all of the potential 
collision scenarios that are representative of possible hazardous situations that may occur in the actual 
airspace. The dynamics formalised in the model consider the final phases of a collision. Based on 
aviation safety studies, the final phases generally occur over a period of time of one minute or less. 
The model is fed the specification of the initial state, which consists only of one aircraft trajectory and 
the number of aircraft to be considered as surrounding traffic during the experiment. The objective of 
this paper is to characterise the surrounding traffic scenarios that involve an induced collision. 
Data results generated by the model could be processed to provide valuable information at the 
operational level for future ATM scenarios. The results are summarised as a set of potential collision 
scenarios that could be used not only to help ATCs to recognise those traffic scenarios in which a 
potential induced collision exists but also to assist the pilots with predictive information regarding 
potential future surrounding traffic during the flight leading to encounters. Therefore, this approach 
would be highly valuable for the operations of ATCs and pilots in the future hectic and congested 
traffic to improve the flight safety. 
• Aviation safety studies: The state space allows for the traceability of the sequence of TCAS 
proposed actions that address an induced collision with the surrounding traffic. Furthermore, causal 
analysis of these induced collisions could provide a baseline the design of new TCAS logic rules to 
mitigate any undesirable effects (Billingsley et al., 2009). 
• ATC: During the flight execution phase, the generated TCAS state space of all possible 
induced collision scenarios can constitute a supporting database that interlink pattern recognition tools 
(Carvalho et al., 2009) to recognise those traffic scenarios that may degenerate into a collision. An 
advanced warning could be automatically displayed in the ATC visualisation tools when the traffic in 
a particular airspace volume matches one of the scenarios generated by this model, depicted in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1. Pattern recognition for potential induced collision scenarios 
• Pilots: Achieving adequate separation to resolve encounters is also contingent on the pilot’s 
workload in the short CA period. The identified potential collision scenarios should be used in the 
flight route re-planner to help the ATC manage air traffic trajectories to ensure a safe flight, thereby 
reducing the encounter probability while partly reducing the pilots’ workload during the execution 
phase. In addition, this approach helps the pilots perceive all of the possible future situations, 
especially the potential collision scenarios in the high-density traffic, and this could decrease threat 
frequency. 
• ATM: There are several studies (Catena et al., 2014; Conde et al., 2012; Brooker, 2013) that 
analyse the introduction of RPAS in a non-segregated airspace. The proposed model could contribute 
to amend some RPAS trajectories without increasing the airspace latent capacity. 
This research discusses pairwise-aircraft threats in which multiple induced threats are resolved 
sequentially in pairs. In a pairwise approach, if one threat solution induces a new threat, then the 
original solution may be modified until a threat-free solution is found. This approach is effective but 
could also potentially fail in certain situations (Kuchar and Yang, 2000). The proposed causal model 
has been developed with the assumption of four-dimensional (4D) trajectories (different three-
dimensional (3D) positions of an aircraft in different discrete time steps), TCAS II equipped aircraft 
and en-route traffic. The induced potential collision discussed in this paper is that TCAS may issue an 
improper manoeuvre, which resolves the encounter with the first threat, but induces a collision with a 
second threat or is incompatible with the second threat. Note that this is different from the term “multi-
threat”, which is used to identify an encounter between a TCAS-equipped aircraft and simultaneously 
with more than one intruder aircraft (Billingsley et al., 2009). 
In addition, uncertainty in the compliance of the pilot to advisories makes the collision avoidance 
logic challenging, with even a single threat between two aircraft possibly causing a collision. The 
current causal model does not explicitly consider variability in the pilot response. Instead, the model 
only uses a deterministic model to predict the future aircraft trajectories. If the model is improved with 
probabilistic pilot response models, then different probabilistic collisions could be generated and 
analysed, in an effort to compute the severity of each uncertainty considering particular surrounding 
traffic. 
A brief outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 summarises the existing 
encounter models and presents the motivation for state space analysis. Section 3 provides a detailed 
description of the TCAS logic. Section 4 introduces the CPN formalism. Section 5 explains the 
generation process of the potential collisions and depicts the proposed causal model. Section 6 
illustrates the results and analysis of the typical collision scenarios. Finally, the conclusions and future 
work are presented in Section 7. 
2 Motivation 
For two aircraft that are both equipped with TCAS (TCAS-TCAS situation), when a one-on-one 
encounter is declared, a two-step process is used to select the cooperative RA for the threat geometry. 
The first step is to decide the appropriate sense (upward or downward) for each aircraft involved. 
Based on the range and altitude tracks of the involved aircraft, the TCAS logic models their flight 
paths from their current positions to the closest point of approach (CPA). Next, TCAS selects an 
opposite sense RA for each aircraft to determine which sense provides the most vertical separation at 
CPA (DoT, 2011), shown in Fig. 2. In the encounter, the downward sense for Aircraft i along with the 
upward sense for Aircraft j will be selected because these non-crossing senses provide greater vertical 
separation. The second step is to determine the RA strength, which is the least disruptive to the 
existing flight paths while still providing at least the Altitude Limit (ALIM) of vertical separation 
between the two involved aircraft at the CPA. In other words, the amendment of the vertical speed 
should be minimal. 
 
Figure 2. TCAS coordination 
The range and altitude tests are implemented on each neighbouring intruder. If the time to the 
CPA in both the horizontal and vertical planes meet the temporal threshold and/or the spatial threshold 
for protected airspace (distance modification (DMOD) and altitude threshold (ZTHR)) in slow-
closure-rate encounters (time criteria values are not appropriate), the intruder is declared to be a threat 
(DoT, 2011). These temporal and spatial values vary with different sensitivity levels (SLs). The values 
used to issue TAs and RAs are shown in Table 1 (DoT, 2011). In addition, the ALIM provides the 
desired vertical minimum separation at the CPA. 
Table 1. Sensitivity level and threshold values 
Own Altitude 
(feet) 
SL 
Time 
(second) 
DMOD 
(NM) 
ZTHR 
(feet) 
ALIM 
(feet) 
TA RA TA RA TA RA RA 
<1000 2 20 N/A 0.30 N/A 850 N/A N/A 
1000-2350 3 25 15 0.33 0.20 850 600 300 
2350-5000 4 30 20 0.48 0.35 850 600 300 
5000-10000 5 40 25 0.75 0.55 850 600 350 
10000-20000 6 45 30 1.00 0.80 850 600 400 
20000-42000 7 48 35 1.30 1.10 850 700 600 
>42000 7 48 35 1.30 1.10 1200 800 700 
 
The scenario shown in Fig. 3 illustrates the process of an induced collision occurrence in which 
TCAS would fail. The scenario consists of three aircraft that are all in the sixth SL: Aircraft 1 is 
cruising at flight level (FL) 145; Aircraft 2 is descending from FL160; and Aircraft 3 is climbing 
slightly from FL148. All aircraft are fully equipped with TCASs. These systems incessantly survey the 
surrounding airspace by sending inquiries and receiving responses from neighbouring aircraft. Thus, 
when Aircraft 2 flies into the range (time) of Aircraft 1, a TA is issued by TCAS to warn the crew of 
Aircraft 1 that an encounter is predicted to occur within 1TAt . Next, a RA at 
1
TAt  is issued to provide a 
suggestion to the pilot. To resolve the detected threat, Aircraft 2 performs a climb operation, while 
Aircraft 1 descends to provide the greatest vertical separation at CPA. Normally, the RA strength 
selects the ALIM as the lowest safe separation that leads to the minimum change of vertical speed. 
Meanwhile, a new threat is detected between Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 3 because of their closing trend in 
the horizontal plane. 
The TAs in both of the aircraft (Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 3) send announcements to the pilots. 
However, the RAs would not be triggered because the aircraft are travelling in opposite directions in 
the vertical plane, and the situation does not deteriorate. Originally, there was no threat between 
Aircraft 3 and Aircraft 2. However, the climbing of Aircraft 2 induces an encounter event with the 
slight climbing Aircraft 3, which is locked into its trajectory by Aircraft 1 (there would be a predictive 
collision if Aircraft 3 descends based on their current flight states). Unfortunately, due to the time 
concurrency of the different actions and the loss of minimal collision separation, a collision could 
occur as a consequence of previous decisions and the extraordinary geometry. 
 
Figure 3. Three-aircraft scenario 
These potential collision situations are notably rare for current traffic densities (less than 0.3 
aircraft per square NM). However, the likelihood of such situations will increase as the airspace usage 
increases. Thus, for a hot spot with the surrounding traffic, different cooperative sense selections for 
resolving a one-on-one encounter would initiate different states that must be analysed to discern the 
cause-and-effect relationships and to explore the potential induced collision states. 
Current Air Traffic Management research programs (i.e., Single European Sky ATM Research 
(SESAR) and next generation air transportation systems (NextGen)) attempt to overcome airspace 
capacity shortages while improving cost-efficient operations and safety (Tang et al., 2014). Air Traffic 
Flow and Capacity Management (ATFCM) was established to utilise the European airspace capacity 
to the maximum extent possible while enabling safe, orderly and expeditious traffic flows. However, 
current ATFCM actions do not ensure traffic separation/synchronisation at an individual level (Ruiz, 
2013). The development and application of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and the 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system (McCallie et al., 2011) enable aircraft 
to obtain highly accurate positional and directional information regarding themselves and other nearby 
aircraft. Thus, several efforts (Nosedal et al., 2014; Ruiz, 2013) have been made to develop trajectory-
based operations (TBOs) that focus on flight efficiency, predictability, environment and capacity to 
construct a trajectory-based ATM system. In such a system, the partners optimise their trajectories 
through common 4D trajectory information, also known as reference business trajectories (RBTs). The 
induced collision scenarios can be generated off-line (by the proposed model) and then stored in a 
database. These identified scenarios could then be used for the development of innovative tools to 
address future congested traffic scenarios while improving the safety of flight. 
• Strategic: The highly efficient computational performance achieved by the algorithms 
(Nosedal et al., 2014; Ruiz, 2013) could be useful for the integration of Decision Support 
Tools (DSTs) designed for the ATFCM. These tools could help to identify geographical areas 
that may have high probabilities of becoming unstable (i.e., hot spots) and to locate ‘‘highly 
congested regions’’ (e.g., a high number of conflicts predicted to occur in a same spatio-
temporal region). Considering the various sources of effecting factors (especially weather 
conditions) that can affect the RBTs, new tools could be deployed to compute the probability 
of trajectories programmed in the hot-spots that could degenerate and match any scenario in 
the induced collision database, thereby providing an auxiliary support in the analysis of hot 
spots. 
• Tactical: During the flight execution phase, the database of all potential induced 
collision scenarios can be directly related to pattern recognition. Proper automation contrast 
can be used to evaluate situations in which multiple aircraft are involved. Thus, the database 
can help us to evaluate the deviation of the proposed trajectories, which could lead to 
hazardous scenarios (existing potential induced collisions) within a foreseen time-window of 
10 to 20 min. This time window could provide sufficient time to allow the ATC to resolve any 
hazardous deviation. 
• Operational: Surveillance technologies (e.g., ADS-B) are fully operative in all aircraft, 
enabling the Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS) (Netjasov et al., 2013) to provide 
the precise self-separation and synchronisation of aircraft. The pattern (a potential induced 
collision scenario) that fits the current situation can provide relevant information to the pilots. 
This approach enhances the ASAS at the operational level in high-density traffic scenarios 
(without the need to heighten or change the relevant logic) to enable precise monitoring of all 
of the traffic to assure safe and efficient operations. 
The potential collision scenarios identified by the proposed causal model are compatible with the 
current surveillance and management of threats, as well as with the on-board TCAS. Thus, the safety 
of air traffic can be ensured by three different layers of threat management (i.e., strategic, tactical and 
operational). This approach may reduce the negative impact of effecting factors on the safety levels of 
the current ATM. 
2.1 Encounter model overview 
Several encounter models based on different methods and techniques have been developed over 
the years to support the certification and performance analysis of TCAS. These models are used to 
generate encounter situations for use in estimating the rate of mid-air collisions events; in these 
models, aircraft are treated as point masses. 
It is necessary to examine the TCAS safety issues that motivated the development of encounter 
models. In Kochenderfer et al. (2010), they described a methodology for producing an encounter 
model construction based on a Bayesian statistical framework, and they used the model to evaluate the 
safety of collision avoidance systems for manned and unmanned aircraft. Kuchar et al. (2004) 
attempted to use a fault tree to model the outer-loop system failures or events that, in turn, define the 
environment for a fast-time Monte Carlo inner-loop simulation of a close encounter. Zeitlin et al. 
(2006) outlined the steps of a safety analysis process to assess the performance of TCAS on 
conventional and unconventional aircraft. Espindle et al. (2009) constructed the U.S. correlated 
encounter model utilising importance sampling techniques to increase the precision of the results and 
to evaluate the safety impact of the latest TCAS (version 7.1). Netjasov et al. (2010) proposed an 
encounter model that contains the technical, human and procedural elements of TCAS operations. The 
model was demonstrated to work well for a historical en-route mid-air collision event (Department of 
Trade, 1982), and the model was powerful in determining the most critical elements that contribute to 
non-zero collision probability in TCAS operations. Several other researchers focused on the pilot 
behaviour that could influence the safety risk. Lee and Wolpert (2012) combined Bayes nets and game 
theory to predict the behaviour of hybrid systems involving both humans and automated components, 
thereby predicting aircraft pilot behaviour in potential mid-air collision situations. 
Chryssanthacopoulos and Kochenderfer (2011) extended the pilot response model in which the pilot 
responded deterministically to all alerts to include probabilistic pilot response models that capture the 
variability of pilot reaction time to enhance robustness. Garcia-Chico and Corker (2007) provided a 
detailed analysis of the human operational errors that would increase the probability of a collision. 
Of special relevance is the Interactive Collision Avoidance Simulator (InCAS, developed by 
EuroControl) (ICAO, 2006). InCAS is a software tool that is TCAS logic-based, and it is designed for 
the replay of a real or a synthetic event. InCAS is an interactive system for the evaluation, study, 
demonstration and training on TCAS, and it is designed to simulate incidents that provide a relatively 
exact reconstruction of reality. Although it is not a standard encounter model for the support of the 
safety assessment of TCAS operations (ICAO, 2006), InCAS provides valuable information and data 
for operational understanding and also for pilot TCAS training. 
The input data of the existing models are the known information of several trajectories. Therefore, 
the models could be used to determine whether a multi-aircraft scenario contains a potential collision 
or not. However, there is a lack of rigorous models to identify and generate all of the potential induced 
collision scenarios for a certain number of aircraft in a particular hot spot area. 
2.2 State space analysis 
There are several formalisms to explore the dynamics of discrete systems, such as an automaton, 
Markov chain, Timed automata, Petri Nets (PN), coloured Petri net (CPN), min-max algebra, etc. (the 
formalisms are summarised in Kristensen and Jensen (2004). Of these formalisms, the PN and CPN 
formalisms are versatile and well-founded modelling languages that can be used in practice for 
systems of the size and complexity found in real industrial applications (Jensen, 2009). CPN is a 
graphical and discrete-event language that combines the capabilities of PN with the capabilities of a 
high-level programming language. Petri nets provide the foundation of the graphical notation and the 
basic primitives for modelling concurrency, communication, and synchronisation toward a very broad 
class of systems. However, these nets are intended to be a general modelling language, i.e., it is not 
aiming to model a specific class of systems. Both PN and CPN have been employed to describe the 
synchronisation of concurrent processes. However, CPN provides the strength that is required to 
define data types and manipulate data values (Salimifard and Wright, 2001). CPN has been used to 
verify and validate systems through property analysis. More recently, the state space analysis tool has 
been used to explore the dynamic evolution of a system and to determine all of the possible future 
states that are reachable from a given current state vector (initial trajectories in this research). 
TCAS is a hybrid system in the sense of informatics, and its components and logic can be analysed 
using discrete system techniques (Ladkin, 2004). These techniques can model the operation of TCAS 
as a discrete sequence of events in time; each event occurs at a particular instant in time and causes a 
change of system state. In addition, although the widespread system has been in application with new 
developments for more than 30 years, essential parts of its causal analysis, especially those for 
potential induced collision scenarios that could be considered to be TCAS failures, apparently have 
not yet been performed, which fits the definition of a state space that contains all of the possible 
occurrence sequences and states that can be reached from an initial (known) state. In Tang et al. 
(2014), a CPN model is introduced as a key approach to analyse the state space of a congested traffic 
scenario in which the events that could drive an encounter into a collision are explored. This model 
provides a useful tool for better understanding the surrounding traffic conditions (both at macro- and 
micro-levels) that could lead to a collision and also to check for future TCAS logic updates. In this 
research, the TCAS logic was modelled to analyse the cause-and-effect relationships between 
successive events (separation minima lost, RAs, TAs, manoeuvres) that produce a phenomenon (state 
of the system). This approach corresponds to the central concept of PN and the enhanced version, CPN 
(Piera and Music, 2011). 
For a flight scenario, the causal model has been demonstrated to be highly useful for checking a 
variety of state space situations. This determination is accomplished by means of a reachability tree 
(also called occurrence graph), in which the different states that can be reached from an initial state 
can be generated together with the events that caused the state change. This approach enables 
understanding of the cause-effect relationship of each action and how the effects of an action are 
propagated upstream and downstream through the different actions (Tang et al., 2014). In essence, the 
analysis problem becomes a search problem in which those organisations responsible for air traffic 
safety can determine the initial aircraft trajectories and the Airborne Collision Avoidance System 
(ACAS) induced manoeuvres that may lead to a failure of resolving the conflicts. 
3 Mathematical description of TCAS operations 
This section specifies the mathematical model for the TCAS II algorithm that is potentially used 
in a one-on-one encounter with both aircraft being TCAS equipped. In general, during normal flight, 
the aircraft receives instructions from ATC and is flying in accordance with the instructions. 
Meanwhile, TCAS is constantly surveying the surrounding airspace, broadcasting interrogations and 
receiving responses from nearby aircraft. Though aircraft mostly fly in the pre-set trajectories, various 
sources of uncertainty, such as the influence of the weather conditions (especially the wind), the 
aircraft control systems (both the pilot and aircraft performance errors) and the positioning/tracking 
precision (even considering the more precise navigation systems), affect the aircraft while flying their 
trajectories in a precise and straight way. The separation between aircraft may decrease and the TCAS 
logic would take effect when the TA/RA criteria are met. The mathematical description of TCAS logic 
is primarily based on (DoT, 2011). 
An aircraft can be modeled as a unique point in the space surrounded by a 3D safety volume 
shape, thus a threat is considered to be resolved by the TCAS when the time and/or the spatial 
threshold of both aircraft overlap, while TCAS logic fails to avoid the collision when the Hcl and Dcl 
volumes of both aircraft overlap. Normally, Dcl is double the average length of the aircraft fleet 
operating in the basic volume (or wingspan if longer) while Hcl is double the average height of the 
aircraft fleet operating in the basic volume. The values of Hcl and Dcl can be obtained from the 
EuroControl reference (EuroControl, 2001). 
3.1 Threat detection algorithm 
Given that TCAS executes with local scope and within a short period, the hot spot to be analysed 
by the proposed model will be called basic volume. This can be regarded as a Euclidean 3D space (not a 
curved space) (Ruiz, 2013) whose definition criteria could be based on the range of reliable surveillance 
that the aircraft supports (generally 14 NM (DoT, 2011)). Euclidean spaces make the construction of 
the basic volume simpler. Thus, a planar projection of the Earth has been considered by using a 
Cartesian coordinate system (Netjasov et al., 2013) and with a minimum distortion (Ruiz, 2013). The 
region formed by x and y axes indicates the horizontal plane, and z stands for the flight level. For 
( 1,2,..., )Aircraft i i n , its dynamic characteristics can be described as (Netjasov et al., 2010): 
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The formula defines
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tv  as the position and speed, respectively, of Aircraft i  in 3D. 
Let it  
represents the course angle. This is the orientation of speed itv  
in the x-y plane (measured from the x 
axis in a counter-clockwise direction). Let it  designate the angle of climb. This is the orientation of 
speed itv  in the vertical plane (measured from the horizontal plane with up as positive and down as 
negative). Let
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( , )i i i Tt h t x t yv v v  be the position and the speed, respectively, of 
Aircraft i  in the horizontal plane and analogously for Aircraft j . 
Depending on the geometry of the encounter, an RA may be delayed or not selected at all if the 
CPA does not meet the DMOD and ZTHR threshold of RA in the corresponding SL. Thus, an 
efficacious threat that would deteriorate to initiate the RA can be detected based on the following set 
of equations. 
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In these above equations,
 ,CPA
ij
t hT  
and
 ,CPA
ij
t zT  
are defined as the time to CPA in the horizontal and 
vertical planes between Aircraft i  and Aircraft j  at time t. The calculation formulas are discussed in 
(Netjasov et al., 2013). The symbols ijt  and 
ij
t  refer to the direction angle of the speed and position 
difference vectors, respectively, and 2ij ijt t     . ,
ij
t hD  
and
 ,
ij
t zD  are the horizontal and vertical 
distances between Aircraft i  and Aircraft j  at time t. ,CPA
ij
t hD  
is the horizontal distance between 
Aircraft i  and Aircraft j  at CPA in the horizontal plane, and
 ,CPA
ij
t zD  
is the vertical distance between 
Aircraft i  and Aircraft j  at CPA in the vertical plane. In factual situations, not all approaching aircraft 
would initiate the resolution measures because sometimes their CPAs are not in the scope of the RA 
criteria. Thus, a TA that will deteriorate to RA should be fired when the following set of conditions is 
met: 
, , , ,(0 ) (0 ) ( ) ( ) (10)CPA CPA CPA CPA
ij ij ij ij
t h TA t z TA t h RA t z RAT Time T Time D DMOD D ZTHR          
In the case of a slow closure encounter due to the spatial values of TA and RA being slightly 
different, the threat can be detected when the horizontal and vertical distances between Aircraft i  and 
Aircraft j  at time t satisfy the spatial criteria: 
, ,( ) ( ) (11)
ij ij
t h TA t z TAD DMOD D ZTHR    
Note that both the time and spatial thresholds of TA and RA depend on the SL (altitude), and 
these are provided in Table 1. 
3.2 Threat resolution algorithm 
If the following alternative set of conditions is satisfied, an RA will be issued. 
, ,(0 ) (0 ) (12)
ij ij
t h RA t z RAT Time T Time      
or 
, ,( ) ( ) (13)
ij ij
t h RA t z RAD DMOD D ZTHR    
where 
RATime  is the time to the CPA threshold value for RA. RADMOD  and RAZTHR  are the range 
and altitude limit values, respectively, for RA issuance in the case of slow-closure-rate encounters 
when the time threshold values are not feasible. A two-step process is used to select the appropriate 
RA for the threat geometry when the RA is issued. First, the RA sense (upward/downward) is set 
based on the predictive altitude at CPA of the horizontal plane. This can be calculated using the 
following expressions. 
, , (14)CPA CPA
i i i ij
t t t z t hz z v T    
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j j j ij
t t t z t hz z v T    
First, TCAS is to determine the resolution sense that is based on the value of 
CPA
i
tz  and CPA
j
tz . Then, 
the higher one turns upward while the other turns downward. Then, TCAS is designed to select the 
strength of the advisory that is the least disruptive to the existing flight path while still providing 
ALIM vertical separation between Aircraft i  and Aircraft j  at CPA. Note that in modelling aircraft 
response to RAs, the expectation is that the pilot will begin the initial
 0
0.25a g
 
acceleration 
manoeuvre within 5 seconds (DoT, 2011). Therefore, in this research, when an encounter occurs, both 
of the aircraft accelerate to appropriate speeds with opposite acceleration (0.25 g and -0.25 g) in the 
vertical plane, and the response time of the pilot is assumed to be 5 seconds. 
For
 Aircraft i
, the appropriate amendment strength should be: 
, (16)CPA CPA
i i j
t z RA t tALIM z z     
Additionally, the acceleration time 
0
i
at  of Aircraft i  can be calculated by this equality: 
0
0 0
2
0
, 0 ,( ) (17)
2 CPA
i
ai i ij i
t z a t h a
a t
a t T t     
Thus, 
0
2
, , , 02 (18)CPA CPA
i ij ij i
a t h t h t zt T T a     
Based on fairness, the acceleration time 
0
j
at  of Aircraft j  should be equal to 0
i
at . 
4 CPN formalism 
CPN formalism supports several quantitative and qualitative methods for the analysis of the 
system dynamics. There are several examples of CPN models (Salimifard and Wright, 2001; Ladkin, 
2004; Zuniga et al., 2013; Piera et al., 2014) developed by the simulation community using quantitative 
approaches. The CPN method has characteristics that allow modelling of true concurrency, parallelism 
or conflicting situations that are present in dynamic systems. The formalism allows for the specification 
of dynamic discrete-event oriented models without ambiguity and also for modelling the information 
flow. This is an important characteristic that can be very useful for decision making. 
The semantics of the modelling formalism CPN can be defined as the tuple (Jensen, 1993): 
( , , , , , , , , ) (19)CPN P T A N C G E I   
where 
 ∑ = {C1, C2, … , Cnc} represent the finite and not-empty set of colours. They allow the 
attribute specification of each modelled entity. 
 P = {P1, P2, … , Pnp} represent the finite set of place nodes. 
 T = {T1, T2, … , Tnt} represent the set of transition nodes such that P T =  , which are 
normally associated activities in the real system. 
 A = {A1, A2, … , Ana} represent the directed arc set, which relate transition and place nodes 
such as A  P  T T P 
 N = the node function N(Ai), which is associated with the input and output arcs. If one is a 
place node, then the other must be a transition node and vice versa. 
 C = the colour set functions, C(Pi), which specify the combination of colours for each place 
node, such as C: P  ∑. 
 G = Guard function, which is associated with transition nodes, G(Ti), G: T EXPR. This is 
normally used to inhibit the event associated with the transition upon the attribute values of the 
processed entities. If the processed entities satisfy the arc expression but not the guard, the transition 
will not be enabled. 
 E = the arc expressions E(Ai), such as E: A EXPR. For the input arcs, they specify the 
quantity and type of entities that can be selected among the ones present in the place node to enable the 
transition. When dealing with an output place, these expressions specify the values of the output tokens 
for the state generated when the transition fires. 
 I = Initialization function I (Pi), which allows the value specification for the initial entities in the 
place nodes at the beginning of the simulation. This is the initial state for a particular scenario. 
 EXPR denotes logic expressions provided by any inscription language (logic, functional, etc.). 
 The state of every CPN model is also called the marking and is composed of the expressions 
associated with each place p. These must be closed expressions, i.e., they cannot have any free variables. 
A model can be graphically represented by circles (called place nodes), rectangles or solid lines 
(called transition nodes) and directed arrows (called arcs) that connect a transition with a place node or 
a place node with a transition. To model the occurrences of activities, the input place nodes to a 
transition node must hold at least the same number of entities (called tokens) as the correspondent arc 
weight. The colours of the potential tokens must satisfy the expressions associated with the colours in 
the arc expressions. The Boolean condition attached to the transition (guard) must be the final 
restriction that must be fulfilled for the transition to occur. When all of the latter conditions are satisfied, 
the transition can be “fired”. This means that the entities that satisfy the mentioned conditions are 
destroyed from the original input place nodes and new entities (i.e., tokens) are created in the output 
place nodes of the transition. The new tokens are created with the characteristics and quantities stated in 
the colours and output arc weights, respectively. 
Traditionally, the place nodes are used to model resource availability or logic conditions that need 
to be satisfied. The transition nodes can be associated with activities or events to be executed.  
One of the most powerful quantitative analysis tools of CPN is the reachability tree. The goal of 
the reachability tree is to find all of the markings that can be reached from a certain initial system state, 
representing a new system state at each tree node and a transition firing in each arc. The reachability 
tree allows the following:  
 All of the manoeuvres that can be issued by TCAS consider the air traffic scenario (markings) 
which can be reached starting from a certain set of initial system conditions (traffic scenario).  
 The transition sequence is fired to drive the system from a certain initial state to a particular 
state of interest. In this paper, end-states are those states in which a collision occurs due to either the 
inability of ACAS to resolve the situation, or alternatively, an internal failure within the individual 
ACAS to provide what would otherwise have been a reasonable RA. 
5 Causal encounter model in CPN formalism 
This section considers a proposed novel generation process of potential collision scenarios and 
constructs the encounter model using CPN formalism. 
5.1 Scenario generation process 
This section describes the processing required to drive an aircraft with a known trajectory into 
various induced collision scenarios consisting of multiple aircraft equipped with TCAS. The initial 
conditions (i.e., input data and parameters) of the proposed model are the aircraft trajectory and the 
amount of intruder aircraft. Based on the threat geometry with the known aircraft, the state of 
neighbouring aircraft is generated through the following step-by-step process: calculate the CPA for a 
threat aircraft, and then characterise its speed and position feasible values. The detailed explanation of 
the process is depicted in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. Each threat consists of a pair of aircraft trajectories. 
Although induced threats are rare in the actual airspace, simulating them is a straightforward extension 
(Billingsley et al., 2009). The causal encounter model that is proposed in this paper generates all of the 
potential induced collision scenarios for multiple aircraft based on the initial state of a representative 
aircraft. These scenarios include the initial airspeed and position at the corresponding time, together 
with a specification of the number of aircraft to be considered as the surrounding traffic in the hot spot. 
The process used for generation of the induced collision scenarios is outlined in Fig. 4. 
 
Figure 4. Scenario generation flow 
 Figure 5. Conceptual depiction of aircraft state generation 
Without loss of generality, Fig. 5 represents the sequence of tasks to compute the aircraft state 
variables (Aircraft j) based on the information of a known aircraft (Aircraft i) trajectory. The following 
computational process is used: Analyse Aircraft i trajectory → Evaluate the Aircraft i CPA → Choose 
a CPA geometry for Aircraft j → Compute the Aircraft j speed → Determine Aircraft j initial position. 
In Fig. 5 a, the state variables of Aircraft i (speed, position, and time) are used as the inputs of the 
model. Suppose that there is a vehicle identified as Aircraft j that has an encounter with Aircraft i. In 
Fig. 5 b, based on the time criteria of TA and RA, a CPA for Aircraft i is automatically computed by 
the model together with the CPA of Aircraft j. This CPA should be in the scope of the threat separation 
of Aircraft i at tCPA, as shown in In Fig. 5 c. In addition, the CPA of Aircraft j is computed from a set of 
feasible geometries. Next, in Fig. 5 d, the possible 3D speed vectors of Aircraft j that satisfy the 
performance constraint are computed again using the model. The speed vector of Aircraft j may be 
variable over a certain range, leading to different possible future situations (state space) in which 
several potential collision scenarios could be induced. Based on the TA time criteria and the chosen 
horizontal and vertical speeds, the initial position of Aircraft j at time t is calculated in Fig. 5 e. Finally, 
the initial state of Aircraft j is obtained as the output. 
Note that in the calculation process, the TA and RA values are determined in the corresponding 
FL (DoT, 2011), while the CPA and speeds are uncertain but are within respective scopes. The 
different alternatives for Aircraft j’s CPA and its possible speeds are used to generate the state space of 
scenarios. The optional values of speeds in the x, y and z axes are bounded by a discrete finite domain; 
thus, the state space is not infinite. Obviously, it would be more realistic when the optional values are 
set with smaller intervals; however, using smaller intervals would result in the increase in the cost of 
computing time. 
This research aims to enable the identification of all of the possible induced collision scenarios 
for the TCAS-equipped aircraft considering surrounding traffic. The initial conditions are easily 
parameterised considering only the specification of one aircraft’s state and the amount of intruder 
aircraft because the states of the neighbouring aircraft are variable due to various sources of 
uncertainty. Based on the above step-by-step process, another state of neighbouring aircraft that would 
have a conflict with one of the existing aircraft could also be calculated. 
When the scenario consists of 3 aircraft (one aircraft with a specified trajectory and two aircraft 
as the surrounding traffic), the process used for the generation of the initial state of Aircraft 3 is similar. 
At this time, the initial states of Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2 serve as the inputs to compute the initial state 
of Aircraft 3 that is deemed to be the output. If Aircraft 3 has the potential for a collision with Aircraft 
2, which is in the RA process of amending its trajectory to resolve the threat with Aircraft 1, then 
Aircraft 3 should be in the collision volume of Aircraft 2 in the RA process. Meanwhile, the possible 
position of Aircraft 3 at time t is restricted to the threat volume of Aircraft 1. However, these aircraft 
are not approaching each other. Based on the CPA and the initial position, the speeds in the horizontal 
and vertical planes are calculated again by the model. 
5.2 Causal model based on TCAS II logic 
The proposed model must be initialised with an instance of a trajectory (Cartesian coordinates, 
speed and time) and the number of aircraft that should be considered as surrounding traffic in the hot 
spot scenario. The results generated by the model provide information to identify the potential induced 
collision scenarios based on step-by-step logic and also to explore the emergent dynamics (state space) 
between the resolution trajectories (RAs) and the neighbouring trajectories. The CPN model 
implements the description of the TCAS logic as a set of transitions. The model generates TCAS 
failures based on the logic sequence of activities presented in Fig. 4. 
5.2.1 Model representation 
For the implementation of a discrete model, the trajectory can be regarded as a sequence of 3D 
waypoints that the corresponding aircraft will follow, with the sequence containing the coordinates 
and speeds. The causal model that is developed for identifying the potential collisions between no 
more than 4 aircraft has been specified in the CPN formalism (Fig. 6, using 12 colours, 33 places and 
13 transitions), and it mainly consists of three blocks of transitions that represent three different 
control events. These have similar functions that can be used to generate the initial state of the next 
neighbouring aircraft. Thus, as explained in Section 5.1, the model can be easily extended to generate 
induced collision scenarios that involve more aircraft by adding extra analogous blocks of transitions. 
 Initialize the model with Aircraft1’s initial state. In accordance with the actual situation and 
requirements, Aircraft1’s initial state (3D position and speed, time) should be used as the 
input of the model to identify any future potential induced collisions. 
 Generate the initial state of Aircraft 2 as a threat for Aircraft 1 (shown in Fig. 7). The first 
block contains three transitions (T1, T2, and T3), which specify the events of producing an 
encounter: T1 calculates the future CPA of Aircraft 1 based on the TA/RA time criteria, 
and the input of this block is the state information of Aircraft 1; T2 computes the CPA of 
Aircraft 2 that is in the minimum threat separation of Aircraft 1 at tCPA. The different 
feasible CPAs of Aircraft 2 (the possible values are stored in Place “Variable1”) 
contributes to the formation of state space. T3 assigns the optional speeds in 3D for 
Aircraft 2, and its initial position is determined based on the known speed and time. For 
example, the case tokens in Place “Vx1” are +1’(0.17)+1’(0.15) which could be set as the 
initial speed of Aircraft 2 in x axis. The selected values from Places“Vx1” “Vy1” and 
“Vz1” form the 3D speed for Aircraft 2. Note that more extensive tokens are set in the 
actual simulation. 
 Generate the initial state of Aircraft 3 as a threat/collision with Aircraft 2. The second block 
possesses five transitions (T4, T5, T6, T7, and T8): T4 copies the inputs of the initial states 
of Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2 (one set of data for a potential collision and the other set for a 
possible threat); T5 obtains the start point of Aircraft 3, which is within the dimensions of 
the protected airspace of Aircraft 1 (not approaching) and the end point of Aircraft 3 that is 
in the collision volume of Aircraft 2 in its RA process; known start and end points, the 
speed of Aircraft 3 can be calculated by T6; T7 computes the CPA of Aircraft 3 that is 
within the minimum threat separation of Aircraft 1, which has amended its vertical speed; 
T8 assigns the optional speeds in 3D for Aircraft 3, and its initial position is determined 
based on the known speed and time. 
 Generate the initial state of Aircraft 4, which has a threat/collision with Aircraft 3. The 
third block has five transitions (T9, T10, T11, T12, and T13), and their functions are 
similar to the corresponding transitions in the second block. 
 Figure 6. Causal model for TCAS logic 
 
Figure 7. Flow chart of first block 
5.2.2 Net specification and description 
The discrete model considers situations that occur in a short period of time with a local scope. 
This results in a trajectory that can be approximated by a sequence of rectilinear timed segments of the 
aircraft (in a simplified view). The colours used to describe all of the information that are required in 
the relevant places are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Colour specification 
Colours 
Description 
Definition Meaning 
aid Int 1…N Aircraft identity 
x R x axis coordinate for 3D position 
y R y axis coordinate for 3D position 
z R z axis coordinate for 3D position 
vx R Speed component in x axis 
vy R Speed component in y axis 
vz R Speed component in z axis 
d R+ Vertical distance between aircraft at CPA 
alim R Desired vertical minimum separation at CPA 
t Int 1…N Current time 
Δt Int 1…N Time interval  
s Int 1…N Optional situations 
 
The specifications of the main places are shown in Table 3. Note that P22-P33 in the third block 
used to generate the initial state of Aircraft 4 have similar functions and characterizations as P10-P21 
in the second block aiming to obtain the initial state of Aircraft 3. Therefore, only the operations of 
P1-P21 are detailed as follows. 
Place “Aircraft State” contains tokens with eight colour attributes to define the initial position and 
speed information of an aircraft: aid is the ID of the corresponding aircraft; (x,y,z) show the 3D 
coordinates; (vx,vy,vz) indicate the 3D speed components; t records the current time. 
Places “Aircraft 1 CPA”, “Aircraft 2 CPA”, and “Aircraft 3 CPA” hold tokens with the same 
eight colour attributes as Place “Aircraft State” to keep the state information of the corresponding 
aircraft at the respective CPA. 
Places “Vx1”/“Vx2”, “Vy1”/“Vy2” and “Vz1”/“Vz2” separately hold several tokens with only 
one colour vx/vy/vz as the constant options of the initial speed in each direction. 
P9 is a copy of P3. 
Places “Situation1” and “Situation2” own tokens with one colour s as the identifier of possible 
threat situations. 
Places “Variable1”, “Variable2”, and “Variable3” store tokens with the range of distance d 
between each pair of aircraft. 
Place “Start-point for Collision” memorizes the start-point information of the involved aircraft 
that would be used to generate an induced collision scenario. Place “Start-point for Threat” holds the 
remaining aircraft that would be used to generate a threat scenario. Place “Aircraft 3 Start-end-point” 
stores the calculated start and end points of Aircraft 3. Place “3-Aircraft Collision” preserves the 
position and speed information of the 3 aircraft, between which there would be a collision. 
Table 3. Place specification 
Num. Places 
Description 
Colour Definition 
P1 Aircraft State AS aid*x*y*z*vx*vy*vz*t 
P2 Variable1 V1 d 
P3 Aircraft 1 CPA AC1 aid*x*y*z*vx*vy*vz*t 
P4 Situation1 S1 s 
P5 Vx1 X1 vx 
P6 Vy1 Y1 vy 
P7 Vz1 Z1 vz 
P8 Aircraft 2 CPA AC2 aid*x*y*z*vx*vy*vz*t 
P9 Aircraft 1 CPA AC1 aid*x*y*z*vx*vy*vz*t 
P10 Variable2 V2 d 
P11 Δt1 T Δt 
P12 Start-point for Collision SP1 aid*x*y*z*vx*vy*vz*t 
P13 Start-point for Threat SP2 aid*x*y*z*vx*vy*vz*t 
P14 Variable3 V3 d 
P15 Situation2 S2 s 
P16 Aircraft 3Start-end-point ASE aid*x*y*z*vx*vy*vz*t 
P17 3-Aircraft Collision 3AC aid*x*y*z*vx*vy*vz*t 
P18 Vx2 X2 vx 
P19 Vy2 Y2 vy 
P20 Vz2 Z2 vz 
P21 Aircraft 3 CPA AC3 aid*x*y*z*vx*vy*vz*t 
6 Results 
Table 4 provides the data used in the different experiments that are used to illustrate the 
feasibility of the CPN model. 
Table 4. Parameter values for the scenarios 
Equipment 
Detection 
range 
(NM) 
RA 
acceleration 
(g) 
primary/strengthening  
RA Pilot Delay 
(s) 
Horizontal 
size 
(m) 
Vertical 
size 
(m) 
SL 
TCAS II 
7.1 
40 0.25/-0.25 5/3 40.74 11.95 6 
The diameter and height of the collision cylinders are twice as long as the horizontal and vertical 
sizes of the aircraft, respectively (i.e., Dcl =0.044 NM and Hcl=78.44 ft) (EuroControl, 2001). The 
computer used for this simulation is an EliteBook laptop with a 2.6 GHz Intel i5 processor and 4 GB 
of RAM, which is enough for the memory requirements of the algorithmic operations and simulation. 
6.1 Three-aircraft scenarios 
In this section, the results from threat resolution of one-on-one encounter with only one aircraft 
(from the surrounding traffic) are summarized. The different induced collision scenarios have been 
grouped into four different scenarios. 
6.1.1 Case representation 
The three-aircraft scenario is shown in Fig. 2 and depicted in Section 2. The three aircraft are all 
in the sixth SL. At 15:22:56, Aircraft 1 is cruising at (8.15 NM, 3.69 NM) in FL 145 with a ground 
speed of 461 kt; Aircraft 2 is at (20.90 NM, 3.69 NM) with a ground speed of 612 kt and descends 
from FL160 with a vertical speed of 100.2 fpm; Aircraft 3 is at (2.91 NM, 3.67 NM) with a ground 
speed of 652 kt and climbs slightly from FL148 with a vertical speed of 120.0 fpm. 
For resolving the threat between Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2, the TA is to fire a warning at 15:23:01. 
As the situation is getting worse, a RA emerges 15 seconds later to ask the crew to climb/descend for 
this encounter (15:23:16). At first, Aircraft 3 does not experience a threat with Aircraft 2. However, 
they encounter each other as a result of the amended flight level of Aircraft 2. Table 5 illustrates the 
waypoints of a partial trajectory of each aircraft before the collision occurs. At 15:23:32, Aircraft 2 
and Aircraft 3 burst into each other’s collision volumes, their horizontal distance is
 
2 2(15.50 15.51) (6.57 6.55) 0.022 0.044 ,Nm Nm      and the altitude interval is 
14880 14825 55 78.44ft ft   . The induced threat between Aircraft 2 and Aircraft 3 is detected at 
15:23:28, and the pilot action time is set as 5 seconds. Thus, the encounter would degenerate into a 
collision. 
Table 5. Waypoints of partial trajectory 
Time Aircraft X(NM) Y(NM) Z(ft) Time Aircraft X(NM) Y(NM) Z(ft) 
15:23:17 Aircraft 1 10.25 5.37 14500.00 15:23:25 Aircraft 1 11.05 6.01 14573.33 
15:23:17 Aircraft 2 17.75 5.37 14850.00 15:23:25 Aircraft 2 16.55 6.01 14836.67 
15:23:17 Aircraft 3 10.26 5.35 14850.00 15:23:25 Aircraft 3 13.06 5.99 14866.00 
15:23:18 Aircraft 1 10.35 5.45 14596.67 15:23:26 Aircraft 1 11.15 6.09 14570.00 
15:23:18 Aircraft 2 17.60 5.45 14848.33 15:23:26 Aircraft 2 16.40 6.09 14835.00 
15:23:18 Aircraft 3 10.61 5.43 14852.00 15:23:26 Aircraft 3 13.41 6.07 14868.00 
15:23:19 Aircraft 1 10.45 5.53 14593.33 15:23:27 Aircraft 1 11.25 6.17 14566.67 
15:23:19 Aircraft 2 17.45 5.53 14846.67 15:23:27 Aircraft 2 16.25 6.17 14833.33 
15:23:19 Aircraft 3 10.96 5.51 14854.00 15:23:27 Aircraft 3 13.76 6.15 14870.00 
15:23:20 Aircraft 1 10.55 5.61 14590.00 15:23:28 Aircraft 1 11.35 6.25 14563.33 
15:23:20 Aircraft 2 17.30 5.61 14845.00 15:23:28 Aircraft 2 16.10 6.25 14731.67 
15:23:20 Aircraft 3 11.31 5.59 14856.00 15:23:28 Aircraft 3 14.11 6.23 14872.00 
15:23:21 Aircraft 1 10.65 5.69 14586.67 15:23:29 Aircraft 1 11.45 6.33 14560.00 
15:23:21 Aircraft 2 17.15 5.69 14843.33 15:23:29 Aircraft 2 15.95 6.33 14830.00 
15:23:21 Aircraft 3 11.66 5.67 14858.00 15:23:29 Aircraft 3 14.46 6.31 14874.00 
15:23:22 Aircraft 1 10.75 5.77 14583.33 15:23:30 Aircraft 1 11.55 6.41 14556.67 
15:23:22 Aircraft 2 17.00 5.77 14841.67 15:23:30 Aircraft 2 15.80 6.41 14828.33 
15:23:22 Aircraft 3 12.01 5.75 14860.00 15:23:30 Aircraft 3 14.81 6.39 14876.00 
15:23:23 Aircraft 1 10.85 5.85 14580.00 15:23:31 Aircraft 1 11.65 6.49 14553.33 
15:23:23 Aircraft 2 16.85 5.85 14840.00 15:23:31 Aircraft 2 15.65 6.49 14826.67 
15:23:23 Aircraft 3 12.36 5.83 14862.00 15:23:31 Aircraft 3 15.16 6.47 14878.00 
15:23:24 Aircraft 1 10.95 5.93 14576.67 15:23:32 Aircraft 1 11.75 6.57 14550.00 
15:23:24 Aircraft 2 16.70 5.93 14838.33 15:23:32 Aircraft 2 15.50 6.57 14825.00 
15:23:24 Aircraft 3 12.71 5.91 14864.00 15:23:32 Aircraft 3 15.51 6.55 14880.00 
6.1.2 Collision induced scenarios with three aircraft 
Based on the scenario generation process of the causal model, first, the state of the second aircraft 
(without a loss of generality, it is called Aircraft 2) that has an encounter with known Aircraft 1 is 
calculated. Then, the state of the third aircraft (Aircraft 3) that is restricted to the threat volume of 
Aircraft 1 (not approaching) and would have a collision with Aircraft 2 flying in the amended 
trajectory can be computed. Thus, for the generation of 3-aircraft collision scenarios can be simply 
understood as: 
 
 
Based on the analysis of the results generated by the causal model, all of the collision scenarios 
can be classified into four typical situations that are summarized in Table 6. The differences between 
these are the relative CPA positions of Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2 involved in the encounter and the 
initial state of Aircraft 2 (climb/descend). However, no matter whether Aircraft 2 climbs or descends, 
the RA direction is selected in view of the CPA position (as shown in Table 6, case 3 is similar to case 
1 and case 4 is similar to case 2). Thus, the four collision scenarios of three aircraft can be merged into 
two typical scenarios (case 1 and case 2). These mainly consider the relative CPA altitude (directly 
affecting the change in RA). 
Table 6. Typical collision scenarios of three aircraft 
Case Graphical illustrations Descriptions 
1 
 
1) At time t, Aircraft i is cruising in level flight with the 
ground speed , ,( , )
i i i
t t x t yv v v  
and 2 2
, ,y( ) ( ) 600
i i
t x tv v kn   
2) At time t, Aircraft j has a ground speed , ,( , )
j j j
t t x t yv v v  
and a rate of descent ,
j
t zv , 
 2 2, ,y ,z( ( ) ( ) 600 ) ( 5000 ,0 )
j j j
t x t tv v kn v fpm     ; then, 
Aircraft i encounters Aircraft j, which is at the higher 
altitude at CPA. Therefore, Aircraft j climbs while 
Aircraft i descends to avoid collision 
3) At time t, Aircraft k has a ground speed 
, ,( , )
k k k
t t x t yv v v  and a rate of climb ,
j
t kv , 
 2 2, ,y ,z( ( ) ( ) 600 ) ( 0,5000 )
k k k
t x t tv v kn v fpm    ; Aircraft k is 
in the TA criteria of Aircraft i but not approaching; 
Aircraft k has no threat with the original trajectory of 
Aircraft j but encounters Aircraft j, which amends its 
speed and
 , ,
( ) ( )
CPA CPA
jk jk
t h cl t z clD D D H    
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1) At time t, Aircraft i is cruising in level flight with the 
ground speed , ,( , )
i i i
t t x t yv v v  
and 2 2
, ,y( ) ( ) 600
i i
t x tv v kn   
2) At time t, Aircraft j has a ground speed , ,( , )
j j j
t t x t yv v v  
and a rate of descent ,
j
t zv , 
 2 2, ,y ,z( ( ) ( ) 600 ) ( 5000 ,0 )
j j j
t x t tv v kn v fpm     ; then, 
Aircraft i encounters Aircraft j, which is at the lower 
altitude at CPA. Therefore, Aircraft j descends while 
Aircraft i climbs to avoid collision
 
3) At time t, Aircraft k has a ground speed 
, ,( , )
k k k
t t x t yv v v  and a rate of climb ,
j
t kv , 
 2 2, ,y ,z( ( ) ( ) 600 ) ( 0,5000 )
k k k
t x t tv v kn v fpm    ; Aircraft k is 
in the TA criteria of Aircraft i but is not approaching; 
Aircraft k has no threat with the original trajectory of 
Aircraft j but encounters Aircraft j, which amends its 
speed and
 , ,
( ) ( )
CPA CPA
jk jk
t h cl t z clD D D H    
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This is similar to case 1. The only difference is that 
Aircraft j climbs (does not descend) at time t 
4 
 
 
 
This is similar to case 2. The only difference is that 
Aircraft j climbs (does not descend) at time t 
6.2 Four-aircraft scenarios 
This section summarizes the results from threat resolutions (RAs) of one-on-one encounters with 
two aircraft in the surrounding traffic. The different induced collision scenarios have been grouped 
into eight different scenarios. 
6.2.1 Case representation 
To illustrate the possibility of induced collisions between four aircraft, let us consider the traffic 
scenario illustrated in Fig. 8. In this scenario, four fully equipped aircraft are considered with two 
predicted encounters (threat 1 between Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2, and the other one is threat 2 between 
Aircraft 3 and Aircraft 4) (Tang et al., 2014). Variable ( 1,2,3,4)iTAt i   is used for the TA emergence time, 
and variable ( 1,2,3,4)iRAt i   indicates the RA. In normal flight, Aircraft 1 is cruising at FL155 and 
Aircraft 2 is cruising at FL160 on an opposing route. When Aircraft 2 starts a descending operation and 
flies into the range of Aircraft 1, a TA is issued by TCAS to warn the crew of Aircraft 1 that a collision 
is predicted to occur within 1TAt . An RA is issued at 
1
RAt  to provide a suggestion to the pilot. Once the 
threat is detected, Aircraft 1 performs a descend operation while Aircraft 2 climbs to provide the 
greatest vertical separation at CPA. Normally, the RA strength selects the ALIM as the smallest safe 
separation that requires a minimal speed change. Meanwhile, a similar TA and RA process is initiated 
between Aircraft 3 and Aircraft 4. When Aircraft 4 comes within the range of Aircraft 3 and a collision 
is predicted to occur, a TA is issued at 3TAt  and an RA is issued at 
3
RAt . The crew in Aircraft 3 respond to 
the RA by attempting to descend, while Aircraft 4 climbs with the strength of ALIM. Unfortunately, 
despite the RA’s resolution of both encounters, a new secondary threat is initiated between Aircraft 4 
and Aircraft 1 as a consequence of previous decisions. This is detected by the TCAS at 20:45:24. The 
crew has to address the emergent encounter. However, there is not enough time left for the pilot to 
avoid this collision. 
In the future high-density traffic with the wide use of RPAS, these situations are more likely to 
appear. For a pair of aircraft which are in the RA process, if another aircraft originally cruises in the 
neighbouring FL and speeds up, a subsequent new RA would be promptly issued and the dangerous 
situation that may initiate a collision could emerge. 
 
Figure 8. Four-aircraft scenario 
The four aircraft are all in the sixth SL. At 20:44:56, Aircraft 1 is cruising at (10.75 NM, 3.56 
NM) in FL 155 with a ground speed of 461 kt; Aircraft 2 is at (20.50 NM, 3.56 NM) with a ground 
speed of 612 kt and descends from FL160 with a vertical speed of 100.2 fpm; Aircraft 3 is at (2.49 
NM, 3.45 NM) with a ground speed of 469 kt and climbs slightly from FL148 with a vertical speed of 
180.0 fpm. Aircraft 4 is cruising at (21.98 NM, 9.35 NM) with the height of 15455 ft and its ground 
speed is 672 kt. 
For threat 1, when Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2 fly within range of one another, a TA is issued to fire 
a warning at 20:45:01. However, the situation is getting worse, and 15 seconds later a RA emerges to 
ask the crew to act upon this encounter (20:45:16). For threat 2, the TA is issued at 20:45:05, and the 
subsequent RA appears when the RA criteria are met (20:45:20). Table 7 illustrates the waypoints of a 
partial trajectory of each aircraft before the collision occurs. At 20:45:28, Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 4 
burst into each other’s collision safety volume, their horizontal distance is
 
2 2(13.95 13.98) (6.12 6.15) 0.042 0.044Nm Nm     , and the altitude interval is 
15476.67 15470.00 76.67 78.44ft ft   . 
Table 7. Waypoints of partial trajectory 
Time Aircraft X(NM) Y(NM) Z(ft) Time Aircraft X(NM) Y(NM) Z(ft) 
20:45:21 Aircraft 1 13.25 5.56 15500.00 20:45:25 Aircraft 1 13.65 5.88 15486.67 
20:45:21 Aircraft 2 20.75 5.56 15850.00 20:45:25 Aircraft 2 20.15 5.88 15843.33 
20:45:21 Aircraft 3 6.24 3.45 15365.00 20:45:25 Aircraft 3 6.84 3.45 15377.00 
20:45:21 Aircraft 4 15.73 6.85 15455.00 20:45:25 Aircraft 4 14.73 6.45 15455.00 
20:45:22 Aircraft 1 13.35 5.64 15496.67 20:45:26 Aircraft 1 13.75 5.96 15483.33 
20:45:22 Aircraft 2 20.60 5.64 15848.33 20:45:26 Aircraft 2 20.00 5.96 15841.67 
20:45:22 Aircraft 3 6.39 3.45 15368.00 20:45:26 Aircraft 3 6.99 3.45 15375.00 
20:45:22 Aircraft 4 15.48 6.75 15455.00 20:45:26 Aircraft 4 14.48 6.35 15460.00 
20:45:23 Aircraft 1 13.45 5.72 15493.33 20:45:27 Aircraft 1 13.85 6.04 15480.00 
20:45:23 Aircraft 2 20.45 5.72 15846.67 20:45:27 Aircraft 2 19.85 6.04 15840.00 
20:45:23 Aircraft 3 6.54 3.45 15371.00 20:45:27 Aircraft 3 7.14 3.45 15373.00 
20:45:23 Aircraft 4 15.23 6.65 15455.00 20:45:27 Aircraft 4 14.23 6.25 15465.00 
20:45:24 Aircraft 1 13.55 5.80 15490.00 20:45:28 Aircraft 1 13.95 6.12 15476.67 
20:45:24 Aircraft 2 20.30 5.80 15845.00 20:45:28 Aircraft 2 19.70 6.12 15838.33 
20:45:24 Aircraft 3 6.69 3.45 15374.00 20:45:28 Aircraft 3 7.29 3.45 15371.00 
20:45:24 Aircraft 4 14.98 6.55 15455.00 20:45:28 Aircraft 4 13.98 6.15 15470.00 
6.2.2 Collision induced scenarios with four aircraft 
Based on the scenario generation process of the causal model, first, the state of the second aircraft 
(called Aircraft 2, without a loss of generality) that has an encounter with known Aircraft 1 is 
calculated. Then, the state of the third aircraft (Aircraft 3) that would have a collision or threat with 
Aircraft 2 is computed. If this is a collision between Aircraft 2 and Aircraft 3 (e.g., the above case), 
then the fourth aircraft (Aircraft 4) can be assumed to have an encounter with Aircraft 3. If it is a 
threat between Aircraft 2 and Aircraft 3, then the fourth aircraft (Aircraft 4) can be assumed to have a 
collision with Aircraft 3. The generation of 4-aircraft collision scenarios can be simply understood as: 
 
 
 
Based on analysis of the results generated by the causal model, all of the collision scenarios could 
be classified into eight typical situations. These are summarized in Table 8. For case 1, the scenario 
could be seen as two separate but interactional threats that initiate the collision between two aircraft in 
their own RA process. Altering the relative CPA altitudes of the aircraft that are involved in each 
threat would give rise to four typical collision scenarios. This is explained in Table 8, and these 
correspond to the condition that step 2 is a collision. For case 5, Aircraft 2 first has a threat with 
Aircraft 1, and then it climbs but encounters Aircraft 3. Here, the two sequent threats are not separate, 
and there are also four typical collision scenarios illustrated in Table 8. These correspond to the 
condition that step 2 is threat and the collision is generated in step 3. The relationships between the 
four aircraft appear to be in a loop that could be called a “deadlock”. 
Table 8. Typical collision scenarios of four-aircraft 
Case Graphical illustrations Descriptions 
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1) 
At time t1, Aircraft i is cruising in level flight with the 
ground speed 
1 1 1, ,
( , )i i it t x t yv v v  
and 
1 1
2 2
, ,y( ) ( ) 600
i i
t x tv v kn  ; Aircraft j has a ground speed 
1 1 1, ,
( , )j j jt t x t yv v v  and a rate of descent 1 ,
j
t zv  
and 
 
1 1 1
2 2
, ,y ,z( ( ) ( ) 600 ) ( 5000 ,0 )
j j j
t x t tv v kn v fpm    
; then, Aircraft i 
encounters Aircraft j, which is at a higher altitude at 
CPA. Therefore, Aircraft j climbs while Aircraft i 
descends to avoid collision
 
2) 
At time t2, Aircraft k has a ground speed 
2 2 2, ,
( , )k k kt t x t yv v v  and a rate of climb 2 ,
k
t zv ; Aircraft l 
is cruising in level flight with the ground speed 
2 2 2, ,y
( , ,0)l l lt t x tv v v and 
2 2
2 2
, ,y( ) ( ) 600
l l
t x tv v kn 
; then, Aircraft k 
encounters Aircraft l, which is at a higher altitude at 
CPA. Therefore, Aircraft l climbs while Aircraft k 
descends to avoid collision
 
3) Originally, Aircraft i and Aircraft l do not have a 
threat, but they encounter each other when both of 
them amend their rate of climb/descent and
 
, ,( ) ( )CPA CPA
il il
t h cl t z clD D D H    
•  2: The difference between case 2 and case 1 is that Aircraft j is at a lower altitude at CPA. Therefore, the 
collision occurs between Aircraft j and Aircraft l 
•  3: The difference between case 3 and case 1 is that Aircraft l is at a lower altitude at CPA. Therefore, the 
collision occurs between Aircraft i and Aircraft k 
•  4: The differences between case 4 and case 1 are that Aircraft j is at a lower altitude at CPA (with Aircraft 
i) while Aircraft l is at a lower altitude at CPA (with Aircraft k). Therefore, the collision occurs between 
Aircraft j and Aircraft k 
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1) 
At time t1, Aircraft i is cruising in level flight 
with the ground speed 
1 1 1, ,y
( , ,0)i i it t x tv v v  
and 
1 1
2 2
, ,y( ) ( ) 600
i i
t x tv v kn  ; Aircraft j has a ground speed 
1 1 1 1, ,y ,z
( , , )j j j jt t x t tv v v v  and a rate of descent 1 ,
j
t zv  
and 
 
1 1 1
2 2
, ,y ,z( ( ) ( ) 600 ) ( 5000 ,0 )
j j j
t x t tv v kn v fpm    
; then, Aircraft i 
encounters Aircraft j, which is at a higher altitude 
at CPA. Therefore, Aircraft j climbs while 
Aircraft i descends to avoid collision
 
2) 
At time t2, Aircraft k has a ground speed 
2 2 2, ,
( , )k k kt t x t yv v v  and a rate of descent 2 ,
k
t zv  and 
 
2 2 2
2 2
, ,y ,z( ( ) ( ) 600 ) ( 5000 ,0 )
k k k
t x t tv v kn v fpm    
; Originally, Aircraft j 
and Aircraft k do not have a threat but encounter each 
other when Aircraft j climbs to resolve a threat with 
Aircraft i. Therefore, Aircraft j reduces its climb and 
Aircraft k climbs to avoid the new threat
 
3) 
At time t1, Aircraft l has a ground speed 
1 1 1, ,
( , )l l lt t x t yv v v  and a rate of climb 1 ,
l
t zv and 
 
1 1 1
2 2
, ,y ,z( ( ) ( ) 600 ) ( 0,5000 )
l l l
t x t tv v kn v fpm    ; Aircraft l is 
in the TA criteria of Aircraft i but not approaching; 
Aircraft l has no threat with the original trajectory of 
Aircraft k but encounters Aircraft k, which amends its 
speed and
 , ,
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CPA CPA
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•  6: The difference between case 6 and case 5 is that Aircraft j is at the lower altitude at CPA. Therefore, 
Aircraft i climbs while Aircraft j descends to resolve the threat 
•  7: The difference between case 7 and case 5 is that Aircraft k is at the lower altitude at CPA. Therefore, 
Aircraft i increases its climb while Aircraft k descends to resolve the threat 
•  8: The differences between case 8 and case 1 are that: Aircraft j is at the lower altitude at CPA. Therefore, 
Aircraft i climbs while Aircraft j descends to resolve the threat; Aircraft k is at the lower altitude at CPA. 
Therefore, Aircraft i increases its climb while Aircraft k descends to resolve the threat 
6.3 Induced collision scenarios 
Based on the scenario generation process, the causal model can be extended to determine all of 
the collision scenarios for a given aircraft trajectory and a particular amount of aircraft as surrounding 
traffic. The initial states of the multiple aircraft that are involved in the scenarios are generated one by 
one. The unique constraint is the rapid expansion of the state space. 
In addition, according to Billingsley et al. (2009), induced encounter scenarios with only three 
aircraft realistically comprise over 95% of the cases (based on analysing the distribution of the number 
of aircraft involved in such induced encounter situations). There was only one situation that involved 
seven aircraft (based on examining 3803 induced encounter situations that were identified using radar 
data from the FAA and Department of Defense sites throughout the United States). Therefore, the 
causal model was extended to generate the state space of different numbers of aircraft involved in a 
local situation. The results are illustrated in Table 9. 
Table 9. Summarized results of multi-aircraft scenarios 
Aircraft 
number 
Typical induced 
collision scenarios 
Computation 
Time 
3 2 34  ´
4 8 2 2´1´´ 
5 24 15 5´2´´ 
6 64 1:32 4´7´´ 
7 160 4:56 3´8´´ 
 
Analysing the typical collision scenarios is a Non-deterministic Polynomial (NP) problem that 
cannot be solved by exploring all of the combinations. In reality, there should be a saturation of the 
density that can be accepted in a local region. Therefore, there is no need to create a fully specified 
induced encounter model designed for the collision scenario generation of many aircraft in a local 
airspace. A fully specified causal encounter model with four aircraft (shown in Section 5.2) would 
require at least 12 colours, 33 places and 13 transitions. More aircraft would need more parameters. 
Based on the summarized results (typical collision scenarios and computation time), each additional 
aircraft increases the number of potential variable correlations by an exponential amount. Therefore, 
this significantly raises the possible collision scenarios (state space). Furthermore, induced encounter 
scenarios in real airspace, as already noted, are relatively rare. 
7 Conclusions 
TCAS is designed to provide last-resort CA guidance directly to pilots. Long-term operational 
experience has demonstrated the utility and efficiency of TCAS. However, it is widely accepted that a 
collision also could occur in an exceptional situation, even if all of the involved aircraft are TCAS-
equipped, e.g., the Überlingen mid-air collision in 2002 (Johnson, 2004). TCAS can actually induce a 
collision that would not have otherwise occurred, especially with dense surrounding traffic, when 
multiple aircraft are involved. There is a lack of causal models in the public domain to characterise the 
surrounding traffic scenarios that could initiate an induced collision; such scenarios could be used for 
the comparison of those actual traffic scenarios to reduce collision frequency. The motivation for the 
development of this causal model is to identify TCAS induced collisions and to support follow-up 
research for the safety analysis of current and advanced ATM concepts including TCAS. The main 
contributions of this paper are as follows: 
• A mathematical model for the TCAS II algorithm was developed to be potentially used in a 
TCAS-TCAS encounter. TCAS II provides TAs to warn pilots of the encounter with 
neighbouring traffic and RAs to prevent a collision by offering a suggested resolution 
manoeuvre to pilots to execute an avoidance manoeuvre in the vertical direction. Using a 
series of mathematical equations, this CA process has been conceptually described. The 
process has also been used as the theoretical basis for construction of the encounter model. 
• A novel scenario generation process of potential collisions was proposed. The only input of 
this model is the aircraft trajectory and the number of intruder aircraft, while the inputs of 
most other encounter models (Netjasov et al., 2013; Kochenderfer  et al., 2010; Billingsley 
et al.,2009; Tang et al., 2014) are the initial states (e.g., trajectories) of all involved aircraft 
for the analysis of particular traffic geometries. In contrast, the proposed model presented 
in this paper aims to generate the potential collision scenarios for a certain number of 
aircraft, based on the trajectory of just one instance representative aircraft, rather than to 
test whether a multi-aircraft scenario contains a potential collision or not. The generated 
encounter scenarios may not be credible within the normal operation of the ATC system, as 
some of them are designed through the use of different cruising flight levels. 
• The encounter model is represented in the CPN formalism. This causal model depicts the 
procedure that takes an aircraft with a known initial state into various induced collision 
scenarios containing multiple TCAS-equipped aircraft. With the state space, the model 
provides a better understanding of the potential collision occurrences for risk assessment by 
comprehending the cause-effect relationship of each action. The initial states of multiple 
aircraft that are involved in the scenarios can be generated one by one. Finally, all of the 
possible situations (state space) can be represented for subsequent analysis to summarise 
the typical induced collision scenarios. 
• A summary is provided of the typical induced collision scenarios based on the simulation 
results of the causal model. Quantitative measurement experiments were conducted to 
validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the encounter model. In addition, for scenarios 
involving three or four aircraft (representative of almost all of the factual situations), the 
detailed process of a collision and the typical scenarios were illustrated and described in 
detail. 
The generated state space of all possible induced collision scenarios could be stored in a database, 
and an advanced warning could be automatically displayed when the traffic in a particular airspace 
volume matches one of the scenarios identified by this model. In addition, to accomplish the 
fundamental purpose of our research, the next steps are 1) to develop the pattern recognition tool to 
recognise those traffic scenarios in which a potential induced collision may exist and 2) to utilise the 
proposed causal model to promote the improvement of the current TCAS logic, which is intended to 
address the future hectic and congested traffic with the enhanced CA performance. 
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